New (better) philosophy theead

[Cholo Molester]

BIL crew reading club? Let’s tackle Lacan first.

[Guybrush Threepwood]

We should do a YouTube video discussion series. That Todd McGowan vid was a good example.

[Cholo Molester]

I’m down. I have a bunch of vids like that in my library.

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

I'm always down

[Mr. Dingle Foot]

Could we do only non-white, non-European authors?

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

Aug 29, 2022 13:00:41 GMT -5 Mr. Dingle Foot said:

Could we do only non-white, non-European authors?

No

[Deleted]

Found a shirt for skinnykinney

www.instagram.com/reel/CjaNgU2jWlj/?igshid=MDJmNzVkMjY=

[lilpat]

[Mr. Dingle Foot]

Rip in power Latour

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

[Al gave some, some gave Al]

I read society of the spectacle recently and thought it was cool. Was I wrong to do this? What should I check out next?

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

Depends on whatcha tryna do?

Never read that one, but I know the gist. The excessively world weary aphoristic side of stuff gets a little grating for me. There’s always the classics of that era (i.e., lefty academic stuff written with intent of having popular crossover), like Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man. If you wanted the peep the ur-ground of that stuff n get some of the underlying motivating ideas, Friedrich Schiller’s The Aesthetic Education of Man (i need to figure out which sections tho bc it is long as fuck) or Kierkegaard, or Husserl’s Vienna Lecture (which is relatively short). Skipping around Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations collection might also be worthwhile.

[Al gave some, some gave Al]

Oct 14, 2022 8:52:58 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

Depends on whatcha tryna do?

Never read that one, but I know the gist. The excessively world weary aphoristic side of stuff gets a little grating for me. There’s always the classics of that era (i.e., lefty academic stuff written with intent of having popular crossover), like Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man. If you wanted the peep the ur-ground of that stuff n get some of the underlying motivating ideas, Friedrich Schiller’s The Aesthetic Education of Man (i need to figure out which sections tho bc it is long as fuck) or Kierkegaard, or Husserl’s Vienna Lecture (which is relatively short). Skipping around Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations collection might also be worthwhile.

Unfortunately lot of the more political stuff isn't available at my local library which is where I get everything. Ima check that other stuff out once I'm done with my halloween reading list.

[meatballmaniac]

have you tried getting pussy

[Al gave some, some gave Al]

Oct 14, 2022 9:26:28 GMT -5 meatballmaniac said:

have you tried getting pussy

I have done this and now wish to understand pussy

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

Half-priced books is sometimes solid. University libraries sometimes have relatively open policies

[Al gave some, some gave Al]

Yeah, I just learned how to convert pdf to kindle format so now I can get to the good shit.

[meatballmaniac]

Oct 14, 2022 9:31:27 GMT -5 Al gave some, some gave Al said:

Oct 14, 2022 9:26:28 GMT -5 meatballmaniac said:

have you tried getting pussy

I have done this and now wish to understand pussy

Same, brother. What a mess.

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

been on a pretty long break from shit after grad school, but I found Sellars's work on process ontology really compelling. Kinda unsure why Mazviita Chirimuuta didn't bite the bullet and just say that a process ontology just makes more pragmatic sense, but I guess a lot of the audience of her work on color takes credence to a folk ontology to be really desirable for reasons I don't quite grasp. 

[1funeral2many]

i post, therefore i am

[Guybrush Threepwood]

NARC, you characterized Genealogy as a fun read - have you read much of Nietzsche? On a bit of a kick lately - wrapping up Twilight/Antichrist and also started Human, All Too Human though at a reported 1,400 aphorisms I'm basically expecting that read to take all year. Such an interesting guy, but I'm really confused about his metaphysics and his beef with idealism. Considering picking up Delueze's book on him to see if that clears anything up at all.

[jonsetsfire]

SPOILER: Click to show

Aug 18, 2022 13:11:33 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

I have settled down to the task of writing these lectures and have drawn up my two chairs to my two tables. Two tables! Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me--two tables, two chairs, two pens. This is not a very profound beginning to a course which ought to reach transcendent levels of scientific philosophy. But we can-not touch bedrock immediately; we must scratch a bit at the surface of things first. And whenever I begin to scratch, the first thing I strike is--my two tables.

One of them has been familiar to me from earliest years. It is a commonplace object of that environment which I call the world. How shall I describe it? It has extension; it is comparatively permanent; it is coloured; above all it is substantial. By substantial I do not merely mean that it does not collapse when I lean upon it; I mean that it is constituted of "substance" and by that word I am trying to convey to you some conception of its intrinsic nature. It is a thing; not like space, which is a mere negation; nor like time, which is--Heaven knows what! But that will not help you to my meaning because it is the distinctive characteristic of a "thing" to have this substantiality, and I do not think substantiality can be described better than by saying that it is the kind of nature exemplified by an ordinary table. And so we go round in circles. After all if you are a plain common-sense man, not too much worried with scientific scruples, you will be confident that you understand the nature of an ordinary table. I have heard of plain men who had the idea that they could better understand the mystery of their own nature if scientists would discover a way of explaining it in terms of the easily comprehensible nature of a table.

Table No. 2 is my scientific table. It is a more recent acquaintance and I do not feel so familiar with it. It does not belong to the world previously mentioned--that world which spontaneously appears around me when I open my eyes, though how much of it is objective and how much is subjective I do not here consider. It is part of a world which in more devious ways has forced itself on my attention. My scientific table is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed; but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the table itself. Notwithstanding its strange construction it turns out to be an entirely efficient table. It supports my writing paper as satisfactorily as Table No. 1; for when I lay the paper on it the little electric particles with their headlong speed keep on hitting the underside, so that the paper is maintained in shuttlecock fashion at a nearly steady level. If I lean upon this table I shall not go through; or, to be strictly accurate, the chance of my scientific elbow going through my scientific table is so excessively small that it can be neglected in practical life. Reviewing their properties one by one, there seems to be nothing to choose between the two tables for ordinary purposes; but when abnormal circumstances befall, then my scientific table shows to advantage. If the house catches fire my scientific table will dissolve quite naturally into scientific smoke, whereas my familiar table under-goes a metamorphosis of its substantial nature which I can only regard as miraculous.

Aug 18, 2022 16:10:22 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

Milton Friedman remarks in Capitalism and Freedom that the neoliberals “were a small beleaguered minority regarded as eccentrics by the great majority of our fellow intellectuals” during the 1960s. By the late-1970s, Foucault is at least prescient enough to realize that the idea of the subject as an “entrepreneur of the self” is proliferating rapidly. How did this come to pass and does Foucault himself shed any light on this issue? A clue might be found in Friedman’s preface to the 1982 edition of Capitalism and Freedom:


"Sometime in the late 1960s I engaged in a debate at the University of Wisconsin with Leon Keyserling, an unreconstructed collectivist. His clinching blow, as he thought, was to make fun of my views as utterly reactionary, and he chose to do so by reading, from the end of chapter 2 of this book, the list of items that, I said, "cannot, so far as I can see, validly be justified in terms of the principles outlined above." He was doing very well with the audience of students as he wen't through my castigation of price supports, tariffs, and so on, until he came to point 11, "Conscription to man the military services in peacetime." That expression of my opposition to the draft brought ardent applause and lost him the audience and the debate."


Consider Friedman’s remarks alongside what Foucault says at the beginning of the ninth lecture:


"The second contextual element is of course the Beveridge plan and all the projects of economic and social interventionism developed during the war. These are all important elements that we could call, if you like, pacts of war, that is to say, pacts in terms of which governments— basically the English, and to a certain extent the American government— said to people who had just been through a very serious economic and social crisis: Now we are asking you to get yourselves killed, but we promise you that when you have done this, you will keep your jobs until the end of your lives. It would be very interesting to study this set of documents, analyses, programs, and research for itself, because it seems to me that, if I am not mistaken, this is the first time that entire nations waged war on the basis of a system of pacts which were not just international alliances between powers, but social pacts of a kind that promised—to those who were asked to go to war and get themselves killed—a certain type of economic and social organization which assured security (of employment, with regard to illness and other kinds of risk, and at the level of retirement): they were pacts of security at the moment of a demand for war. The demand for war on the part of governments is accompanied—and very quickly; there are texts on the theme from 1940—by this offer of a social pact and security."

As a final observation, we should note Foucault’s prescience here, as I know of very few popular criticisms of neoliberalism that consider the role of the draft (although perhaps I am merely ignorant). The advance of neoliberalism was predicated (at least in part) by a breakdown in the ruling bargain that wounded the previous post-war Keynesian consensus. The “social pact” betweengovernor and governed based on the promise of security gave way to a different social pact that promised the full and free development of human capital in exchange for a degree of insecurity and precarity.

Aug 18, 2022 16:18:55 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

A good deal of empirical motivation for a shift towards process ontology comes from recent work in the philosophy of biology. Dupré and Nicholson (2018) list metabolic turnover, ontogeny, and ecological interdependence as three key empirical motivations for a process ontology of biology. Regarding metabolic turnover, consider a truck without any gas in the tank. The truck does not cease to exist. We might metaphorically speak of an engine dying because of a lack of fuel, but of course we do not mean that it literally dies: Its “structural integrity” remains intact. The situation is quite different for living biological organisms: Without the metabolic process, we simply don’t have a living organism. Furthermore, the material make-up of single and multicellular organisms changes with metabolic events. This is as true for the simplest lifeforms as it is for fully-developed humans beings: “the cells lining our stomach only last around five days; cells of our epidermis are renewed every two weeks; our red blood cells are replenished after four months; our liver as a whole is regenerated on a yearly basis; and our entire skellytan is replacement each decade.” While a biological organism appears to be just as stable and solid as a block of steel, it is in fact dynamic and processual. Rather than a substantial thing that contains processes, we might better think of biological organisms as processes instantiated by things. We witness this same dynamism in other areas of biological research. For example, philosophers of biology long agonized over the metaphysical status of a species. It was thought that a species must be a sort of individual thing, yet species are made up of multiple members and the nature of evolutionary development results in “fuzzy boundaries” between one species and another. Thus, it makes more sense to think of a given species as individuated by processes, such as cycles of reproduction, developmental processes, ecological niches, and the persistence of a lineage. An explication of the entirety of Dupre and Nicholson’s argumentation is unnecessary, but it is worth noting that they conclude that processes are what biology primarily studies. An emphasis on process is more explanatorily adequate when ones wishes to understand the results of biological research and determine in what direction future studies ought to go.



Revisionary metaphysics is never desirable in and of itself: It always makes philosophical work messy, and it disrupts the working vocabulary philosophers have developed. However, if it is more explanatorily adequate in philosophical discussions of biology, then a processist approach may very well serve philosophical discussions of perception just as well. Wilfrid Sellars believed a process ontology would best resolve the conflict between the manifest and scientific images, as did his advisor at the University of Buffalo, Marvin Farber. If much of the philosophical debate around color emerges from a perceived clash between manifest and scientific images, then the route ultimately taken by Sellars himself ought to be of interest.



To conclude, let’s return to Chirimuuta’s three desiderata:



    1. A view that accommodates the inner-relatedness and outer-directedness of color (its “Janusfacedness”).

    2. A monistic approach—a way of thinking about color that does not presuppose a problematic subject–

        object dichotomy.

    3. A means to avoid any contentious reification of color.



If we can adopt the process ontological approach to which Chirimuuta alludes, then she does indeed meet her stated desiderata without any dire consequences. As far as the “Janus-facedness” of color goes, we can talk about its inner-relatedness and its outer-directedness without finding ourselves talking about two different topics. Rather, we’re looking at different parts or time-slices of the same process. The perceiver, the visual system, and the stimuli are all on the same footing, and all areequally real elements in the process. Color adverbialism succeeds in meeting its monistic aims, because color does not turn out to be something that is simply created by the mind; It is part of how the mind processes and represents the mind-independent external world. Finally, color adverbialism avoided any contentious reification of color because color is not reduced to the properties of a concrete existent object. If prioritizing process works in this instance, then it very well may work to resolve other philosophical issues concerning qualia and the mind-body problem.

Imagine posting all of this and not getting a single like out of it. Smdh.

[jonsetsfire]

Oct 14, 2022 9:31:27 GMT -5 Al gave some, some gave Al said:

Oct 14, 2022 9:26:28 GMT -5 meatballmaniac said:

have you tried getting pussy

I have done this and now wish to understand pussy

We've moved on to bussy. Always a step behind.

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

May 6, 2023 8:25:01 GMT -5 Guybrush Threepwood said:

NARC, you characterized Genealogy as a fun read - have you read much of Nietzsche? On a bit of a kick lately - wrapping up Twilight/Antichrist and also started Human, All Too Human though at a reported 1,400 aphorisms I'm basically expecting that read to take all year. Such an interesting guy, but I'm really confused about his metaphysics and his beef with idealism. Considering picking up Delueze's book on him to see if that clears anything up at all.

Not really. Beyond Good and Evil n the Genealogy. Might one day go harder i dunno.

Deleuze’s book is gonna be more of a book about Deleuze than Nietzsche, but I’ve heard Deleuze’s history of philosophy books are more broadly well-received than anything else he wrote

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

May 6, 2023 8:40:12 GMT -5 jonsetsfire said:

SPOILER: Click to show

Aug 18, 2022 13:11:33 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

I have settled down to the task of writing these lectures and have drawn up my two chairs to my two tables. Two tables! Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me--two tables, two chairs, two pens. This is not a very profound beginning to a course which ought to reach transcendent levels of scientific philosophy. But we can-not touch bedrock immediately; we must scratch a bit at the surface of things first. And whenever I begin to scratch, the first thing I strike is--my two tables.

One of them has been familiar to me from earliest years. It is a commonplace object of that environment which I call the world. How shall I describe it? It has extension; it is comparatively permanent; it is coloured; above all it is substantial. By substantial I do not merely mean that it does not collapse when I lean upon it; I mean that it is constituted of "substance" and by that word I am trying to convey to you some conception of its intrinsic nature. It is a thing; not like space, which is a mere negation; nor like time, which is--Heaven knows what! But that will not help you to my meaning because it is the distinctive characteristic of a "thing" to have this substantiality, and I do not think substantiality can be described better than by saying that it is the kind of nature exemplified by an ordinary table. And so we go round in circles. After all if you are a plain common-sense man, not too much worried with scientific scruples, you will be confident that you understand the nature of an ordinary table. I have heard of plain men who had the idea that they could better understand the mystery of their own nature if scientists would discover a way of explaining it in terms of the easily comprehensible nature of a table.

Table No. 2 is my scientific table. It is a more recent acquaintance and I do not feel so familiar with it. It does not belong to the world previously mentioned--that world which spontaneously appears around me when I open my eyes, though how much of it is objective and how much is subjective I do not here consider. It is part of a world which in more devious ways has forced itself on my attention. My scientific table is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed; but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the table itself. Notwithstanding its strange construction it turns out to be an entirely efficient table. It supports my writing paper as satisfactorily as Table No. 1; for when I lay the paper on it the little electric particles with their headlong speed keep on hitting the underside, so that the paper is maintained in shuttlecock fashion at a nearly steady level. If I lean upon this table I shall not go through; or, to be strictly accurate, the chance of my scientific elbow going through my scientific table is so excessively small that it can be neglected in practical life. Reviewing their properties one by one, there seems to be nothing to choose between the two tables for ordinary purposes; but when abnormal circumstances befall, then my scientific table shows to advantage. If the house catches fire my scientific table will dissolve quite naturally into scientific smoke, whereas my familiar table under-goes a metamorphosis of its substantial nature which I can only regard as miraculous.

Aug 18, 2022 16:10:22 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

Milton Friedman remarks in Capitalism and Freedom that the neoliberals “were a small beleaguered minority regarded as eccentrics by the great majority of our fellow intellectuals” during the 1960s. By the late-1970s, Foucault is at least prescient enough to realize that the idea of the subject as an “entrepreneur of the self” is proliferating rapidly. How did this come to pass and does Foucault himself shed any light on this issue? A clue might be found in Friedman’s preface to the 1982 edition of Capitalism and Freedom:


"Sometime in the late 1960s I engaged in a debate at the University of Wisconsin with Leon Keyserling, an unreconstructed collectivist. His clinching blow, as he thought, was to make fun of my views as utterly reactionary, and he chose to do so by reading, from the end of chapter 2 of this book, the list of items that, I said, "cannot, so far as I can see, validly be justified in terms of the principles outlined above." He was doing very well with the audience of students as he wen't through my castigation of price supports, tariffs, and so on, until he came to point 11, "Conscription to man the military services in peacetime." That expression of my opposition to the draft brought ardent applause and lost him the audience and the debate."


Consider Friedman’s remarks alongside what Foucault says at the beginning of the ninth lecture:


"The second contextual element is of course the Beveridge plan and all the projects of economic and social interventionism developed during the war. These are all important elements that we could call, if you like, pacts of war, that is to say, pacts in terms of which governments— basically the English, and to a certain extent the American government— said to people who had just been through a very serious economic and social crisis: Now we are asking you to get yourselves killed, but we promise you that when you have done this, you will keep your jobs until the end of your lives. It would be very interesting to study this set of documents, analyses, programs, and research for itself, because it seems to me that, if I am not mistaken, this is the first time that entire nations waged war on the basis of a system of pacts which were not just international alliances between powers, but social pacts of a kind that promised—to those who were asked to go to war and get themselves killed—a certain type of economic and social organization which assured security (of employment, with regard to illness and other kinds of risk, and at the level of retirement): they were pacts of security at the moment of a demand for war. The demand for war on the part of governments is accompanied—and very quickly; there are texts on the theme from 1940—by this offer of a social pact and security."

As a final observation, we should note Foucault’s prescience here, as I know of very few popular criticisms of neoliberalism that consider the role of the draft (although perhaps I am merely ignorant). The advance of neoliberalism was predicated (at least in part) by a breakdown in the ruling bargain that wounded the previous post-war Keynesian consensus. The “social pact” betweengovernor and governed based on the promise of security gave way to a different social pact that promised the full and free development of human capital in exchange for a degree of insecurity and precarity.

Aug 18, 2022 16:18:55 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

A good deal of empirical motivation for a shift towards process ontology comes from recent work in the philosophy of biology. Dupré and Nicholson (2018) list metabolic turnover, ontogeny, and ecological interdependence as three key empirical motivations for a process ontology of biology. Regarding metabolic turnover, consider a truck without any gas in the tank. The truck does not cease to exist. We might metaphorically speak of an engine dying because of a lack of fuel, but of course we do not mean that it literally dies: Its “structural integrity” remains intact. The situation is quite different for living biological organisms: Without the metabolic process, we simply don’t have a living organism. Furthermore, the material make-up of single and multicellular organisms changes with metabolic events. This is as true for the simplest lifeforms as it is for fully-developed humans beings: “the cells lining our stomach only last around five days; cells of our epidermis are renewed every two weeks; our red blood cells are replenished after four months; our liver as a whole is regenerated on a yearly basis; and our entire skellytan is replacement each decade.” While a biological organism appears to be just as stable and solid as a block of steel, it is in fact dynamic and processual. Rather than a substantial thing that contains processes, we might better think of biological organisms as processes instantiated by things. We witness this same dynamism in other areas of biological research. For example, philosophers of biology long agonized over the metaphysical status of a species. It was thought that a species must be a sort of individual thing, yet species are made up of multiple members and the nature of evolutionary development results in “fuzzy boundaries” between one species and another. Thus, it makes more sense to think of a given species as individuated by processes, such as cycles of reproduction, developmental processes, ecological niches, and the persistence of a lineage. An explication of the entirety of Dupre and Nicholson’s argumentation is unnecessary, but it is worth noting that they conclude that processes are what biology primarily studies. An emphasis on process is more explanatorily adequate when ones wishes to understand the results of biological research and determine in what direction future studies ought to go.



Revisionary metaphysics is never desirable in and of itself: It always makes philosophical work messy, and it disrupts the working vocabulary philosophers have developed. However, if it is more explanatorily adequate in philosophical discussions of biology, then a processist approach may very well serve philosophical discussions of perception just as well. Wilfrid Sellars believed a process ontology would best resolve the conflict between the manifest and scientific images, as did his advisor at the University of Buffalo, Marvin Farber. If much of the philosophical debate around color emerges from a perceived clash between manifest and scientific images, then the route ultimately taken by Sellars himself ought to be of interest.



To conclude, let’s return to Chirimuuta’s three desiderata:



    1. A view that accommodates the inner-relatedness and outer-directedness of color (its “Janusfacedness”).

    2. A monistic approach—a way of thinking about color that does not presuppose a problematic subject–

        object dichotomy.

    3. A means to avoid any contentious reification of color.



If we can adopt the process ontological approach to which Chirimuuta alludes, then she does indeed meet her stated desiderata without any dire consequences. As far as the “Janus-facedness” of color goes, we can talk about its inner-relatedness and its outer-directedness without finding ourselves talking about two different topics. Rather, we’re looking at different parts or time-slices of the same process. The perceiver, the visual system, and the stimuli are all on the same footing, and all areequally real elements in the process. Color adverbialism succeeds in meeting its monistic aims, because color does not turn out to be something that is simply created by the mind; It is part of how the mind processes and represents the mind-independent external world. Finally, color adverbialism avoided any contentious reification of color because color is not reduced to the properties of a concrete existent object. If prioritizing process works in this instance, then it very well may work to resolve other philosophical issues concerning qualia and the mind-body problem.

Imagine posting all of this and not getting a single like out of it. Smdh.

it’s called copying and pasting, you dumb bitch

[jonsetsfire]

May 6, 2023 9:49:50 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

May 6, 2023 8:40:12 GMT -5 jonsetsfire said:

SPOILER: Click to show

Imagine posting all of this and not getting a single like out of it. Smdh.

it’s called copying and pasting, you dumb bitch

Still. No likes.

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

May 6, 2023 9:52:15 GMT -5 jonsetsfire said:

May 6, 2023 9:49:50 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

it’s called copying and pasting, you dumb bitch

Still. No likes.

The true and earnest intellect has no need for likes. I practice epistemic humility.

[Guybrush Threepwood]

May 6, 2023 9:48:31 GMT -5 Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ said:

May 6, 2023 8:25:01 GMT -5 Guybrush Threepwood said:

NARC, you characterized Genealogy as a fun read - have you read much of Nietzsche? On a bit of a kick lately - wrapping up Twilight/Antichrist and also started Human, All Too Human though at a reported 1,400 aphorisms I'm basically expecting that read to take all year. Such an interesting guy, but I'm really confused about his metaphysics and his beef with idealism. Considering picking up Delueze's book on him to see if that clears anything up at all.

Not really. Beyond Good and Evil n the Genealogy. Might one day go harder i dunno.

Deleuze’s book is gonna be more of a book about Deleuze than Nietzsche, but I’ve heard Deleuze’s history of philosophy books are more broadly well-received than anything else he wrote

I wouldn't consider that a problem. I'm interested in him too.

[Ⓝ𝒶𝓇匚𝐊ηĮ𝐟ᗴᖇ]

Word, wasn’t sayin it was. I wanna check out Deleuze’s historical works at some point, but I dunno if I’ll ever bother with the later material again. Cracked some of the books open or looked at a lecture or asked someone who DID give a fuck about Deleuze, and I don’t really get the point of his work or why he needs to introduce a whole new tedious vocabulary.

[Guybrush Threepwood]

FWIW I was blown away by Anti-Oedipus; it really framed a nascent understanding I had around Mark Fisher and Nick Land (i.e. high level capitalist realism and accelerationism). To be honest, I'm not sure where Deleuze ended and Guattari started, though. I need more exposure. Most of all I need time.